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The U.S. diagnostic  imaging equipment  industry stands astride  several of the most 
noteworthy  trends in the current U.S. economy.  Diagnostic  imaging equipment,  which includes 
such machines  as x-ray machines,  CT (computed  tomography)  scanners, and MR (magnetic 
resonance)  scanners,  forms visual  images of areas within  the body for diagnostic  purposes. 
Thus, although  the diagnostic  imaging  equipment  industry  is a manufacturing  industry,  its fate is 
closely  tied to the service sector-and  specifically  to health  care.  Diagnostic  imaging  shared in 
the meteoric  rise of health  care spending  over the last several decades.  Now it shares the effects 
of managed care and other concerted  efforts  at health  care cost containment. 
Diagnostic  imaging equipment  is also a high technology  industry.  The design of such 
equipment  is extremely  engineering-intensive--combining  mechanical  and electrical  engineering 
with the specialized  engineering  involved  in regulating  various  forms of radiation.  New 
technological  generations  of CT or MR scanners  succeed each other every few years, not unlike 
personal  computers.  The combination  of safety concerns  with enormous  complexity  renders 
these instruments  among the most technologically  sophisticated  products  manufactured  in the 
world today.  Unlike  computers,  however,  diagnostic  imaging  machines  are typically  produced 
in small batches.  The entire  U.S. output of CT scanners in a given year can be counted  in 
hundreds, and the price tag for a single high-end  CT or MR machine  typically  exceeds one 
million  dollars. 
Thus, while diagnostic  imaging  equipment  is not by any means a typical  industry,  it 
offers an example  of a rapidly  changing,  high technology  sector-the  kind of industry  in which, 
according  to many observers,  United  States manufacturers  ought to excel.  And indeed,  for most 
of the hundred-year  history  of this industry,  U.S. producers  have led the field, generating 
engineering  jobs  aplenty  and production  jobs  paying well above the average  wage economy- 
wide.  But in the last two decades, there have been dramatic  transformations,  which have 
changed the face of the industry and pose new challenges  for U.S. companies.  In the process, 
while world diagnostic  imaging equipment  leader General Electric  has successfully  maintained 
and even slightly  increased  its market  share, second-tier  U.S. producers  have lost ground to 
Japanese  and European  manufacturers. 
The process of economic  change  in the industry can be summarized  in four propositions. 
1) Thirty-five  years  of rapid  growth  in U.S. demand  may  be coming  to an end, 
making  the  international  market  increasingly  important.  Since the early  1960s 
demand for diagnostic  imaging  equipment  has expanded vigorously.  In addition,  and 
helping  to fuel the demand,  there has been an exuberant  run of innovation.  As of the 
early  1960s  the diagnostic  imaging  industry  consisted  of x-ray machinery  alone.  As of 
the late  199Os,  there are substantial  markets in addition  for four other major  forms of 
diagnostic  imaging  equipment  (CT, MR, ultrasound,  nuclear  medical  instruments),  as 
well as a number of smaller  markets  (for example,  positron  emission  tomography  PET], 
picture  archiving  and communication  systems [PACS]).  However, the rise of managed 
care in the world’s largest market  for diagnostic  imaging,  the United  States, along  with 
fiscal pressures in Western Europe,  appear to be causing  growth in these mature  markets 
to level off.  Rapid demand  growth in the future is likely  to occur in developing 
countries. 
1 2) U.S.  producers  have  undertaken  outsourcing  and  downsizing.  Companies  have 
downsized  in response to dips in the market  for particular  products, as well as the long-. 
term flattening  of health  care demand.  U.S. companies’  outsourcing  of components  has 
shifted  many production  and some engineering  to smaller  companies.  The net impact of 
outsourcing  on high quality jobs  is unclear,  since it decreases  good jobs  in the company, 
but is likely  to improve jobs  in the suppliers. 
3) Japanese  producers  have  made  significant  inroads  into  the  global  and  U.S. 
diagnostic  imaging  equipment  markets.  For the first seventy years of the diagnostic 
imaging  industry,  U.S. and European  producers  held sway, particularly  in their home 
markets.  But over the last 30 years, Japanese  producers  have entered and steadily 
expanded  their market  share.  In addition  to producing  equipment  under their own brand 
names, Japanese  manufacturers-acting  as suppliers, joint  venture  partners,  or 
subsidiaries-have  supplied  components  and complete  machines  to be sold by U.S. and 
European  companies. 
4) There  is some  evidence  that  U.S.  companies  have  carried  out  less organizational 
integration  of suppliers,  engineers,  and  production  workers  than  Japanese 
producers.  By organizational  integration,  we mean the integration  of productive  actors 
into learning  and decision-making  activities.  The existing  case study literature  has not 
paid enough attention  to workforce  issues to adequately  assess the state of organizational 
integration  in U.S. companies,  let alone  to demonstrate  the connection  between 
organizational  integration  on the one hand, and job  quality  and competitiveness  on the 
other.  However, the limited  evidence  we have been able to find suggests that, as in other 
industries,  U.S. producers  have achieved  less organizational  integration  of certain  groups 
than have their Japanese  counterparts. 
To trace this recent history,  this paper draws on the case study literature  on diagnostic 
imaging, on publicly  available  industry data, and on the business press.  It also incorporates  very 
preliminary  findings  from interviews  and site visits by the author  and others at five diagnostic 
imaging  companies,  two in the United  States and three in Japan.  At the companies’  request, 
their identities  must currently  remain  confidential.  Some of the company-based  research  has 
been supported by the Sloan Foundation  through  a project  entitled  “Corporate  Restructuring, 
Skill Formation,  and Earnings  Inequality”. ’ 
The paper unfolds  in four sections  that mirror the four propositions.  Each section 
summarizes both quantitative  trends and case study evidence.  The evidence  available  from 
published  sources, coupled  with preliminary  interview  findings,  reveal  quite a few interesting 
patterns, but also leave a great deal unanswered.  Consequently,  we follow  these four sections 
with a brief conclusion  making  the case for additional  case study research and sketching 
directions  for such future research. 
’ The project  is headed by Harold Salzman of Jobs for the Future (a Boston-based  nonprofit 
research organization  focusing  on employment,  training,  and education),  and includes  Philip 
Moss and Chris Tilly  of the University  of Massachusetts  at Lowell as senior  investigators. 
2 1) Growth  of the  diagnostic  imaging  industry 
An  introduction  to diagnostic  imaging 
The diagnostic  imaging equipment  industry produces machines  that visualize  structures 
and processes  inside the human body for the purposes of medical  diagnosis.  Currently, 
diagnostic  imaging  embraces  six main types of equipment,  often called  “modalities”‘: 
1) Conventional  x-ray  equipment.  Conventional  x-ray equipment,  the oldest modality, 
dates back to  1896.  Conventional  x-ray machines  pass x-rays through  the patient’s  body to a 
piece of film.  Because  x-rays are selectively  deflected  by areas of greater density  (particularly 
bone), the resulting  image shows structures  within  the patient’s  body.  X-rays are often  used in 
conjunction  with contrast  media, chemicals  injected  or ingested  within  the patient  to highlight 
particular  anatomical  features. 
2) Nuclear  medical  instruments.  Unlike  other diagnostic  imaging  modalities,  nuclear 
medicine  uses the patient’s  body  as the radiation  source.  Radionuclides  (radioactive  substances 
that emit gamma rays) are ingested by or injected  into the patient,  and then a detector  is used to 
form a visual image of these radioactive  materials  within  the body.  This method  depends on 
radiopharmaceuticals  that are absorbed  selectively  by particular  organs, or absorbed  at different 
rates by healthy  and diseased tissue.  The first viable  nuclear  medical  imaging  machine  went on 
sale in 1959.  Nuclear  medicine  is relatively  non-invasive  and particularly  useful for examining 
physiological  functions  (since sequential  images can track the uptake  of marker chemicals  by an 
organ), but offers lower resolution  than other modalities. 
Nuclear medicine  has given rise to two specialized  spin-offs.  Single  photon  emission 
computed  tomography  (SPECT)  detects  photons  emitted  by the radionuclides,  and saw product 
launches  in the mid-l 970s.  Positron  emission  tomography  (PET),  in turn, specifically  detects 
photons created  by positrons  (positively  charged electrons)  generated  by decay of the 
radionuclides.  Commercial  PET systems first appeared  in the late  1970s.  Despite the hopes of 
their innovators,  neither  SPECT nor PET has yet become  a large market. 
3) Ultrasonic  imaging  equipment.  Ultrasound  equipment  passes high-frequency  sound 
waves, rather than x-rays, through  the body to form an image by the same methods  as sonar.  The 
first commercial  ultrasonic  imager appeared  in 1963, but the breakthrough  in ultrasound 
technology  occurred  in  1974, when a small company,  Rohe Scientific,  developed  a the first 
practical  stored video “gray scale,” permitting  far greater resolution  than previous black-and- 
white systems.  Ultrasound  imaging  does not use ionizing  radiation  or invasive  contrast  media, 
and therefore  is the method  of choice  for visualizing  the fetus in utero.  Ultrasound  is also less 
expensive  than other modalities,  but ultrasound  images are more difficult  to interpret  than those 
formed by other methods  (Friar  1987). 
4) Computed  tomography  (CT)  scanners.  CT scanners,  first sold in 1972, once more 
use x-rays.  A CT scanner beams x-rays at detectors  at a series of specified  positions  and angles, 
’ This description  of the modalities  draws on IDD 1995, McKay  1983, and Mitchell  1988. 
3 in order to create  images of a series of thin slices of the body.  This series of slices allows 
physicians  to visualize  structures  inside the body in three dimensions.  CT scanning  can 
distinguish  among 2000 levels of density,  whereas standard radiography  can only distinguish 
among 20.  However, CT scans are considerably  more expensive. 
5) Magnetic  resonance  imaging  (MR, or MRI) equipment.  Magnetic  resonance 
exploits  the fact that atomic  nuclei  of various  elements  align themselves  in distinctive  ways 
when subject to a strong magnetic  field.  A MR scanner applies  such a field,  then transmits  radio 
waves, resulting  in the release  of energy that can be used to map structure  and/or function.  The 
first MR imaging  machines  were marketed  in  1980.  MR scanning  provides  very sharp images 
without  ionizing  radiation,  but remains  quite expensive.  The potential  of using MR scanners  to 
analyze chemical  changes (that is, physiological  diction)  as well as anatomical  structure, touted 
by MR producers  since the modality’s  inception,  has not yet been fully realized,  though a small 
market  for functional  MR equipment  exists. 
6) Digital  radiography  equipment.  Digital  radiography  uses the same principle  as 
conventional  x-rays, creating  two-dimensional  images of the body.  However, digital  x-ray 
equipment,  first marketed  commercially  in 198  1, captures images on a detector  rather than a 
piece of film, so that the information  in the images can be manipulated  by computer  systems. 
One standard application  is “digital  subtraction”:  an area of the body is x-rayed with and without 
a contrast  medium,  and the resulting  images are digitally  subtracted  to sharply focus on where 
the contrast  medium  has been taken  up by the body.  Digital  radiography  offers greater 
resolution  than conventional  radiography  (and allows  use of smaller  amounts  of invasive  contrast 
media), but at lower cost than CT scanning. 
In addition  to these six main modalities,  the diagnostic  imaging  industry  sells equipment 
designed to manage  images created by a variety  of modalities: 
7) Picture  archiving  and  communication  systems  (PACS).  PACS  are computer 
systems that electronically  record and archive  images generated  by any of the previous  six 
modalities.  PACS, often called  “image  management  systems,” were first commercialized  in the 
1980s.  PACS are not yet widespread,  since despite the appeal of “one-stop  shopping”  they still 
are technically  inferior  to film in some regards (including  some dimensions  of image quality). 
But industry analysts  expect the market  for PACS to expand to rival the markets  for MR and CT 
scanners  in the United  States (Medical  and Healthcare  Marketplace  Guide  1995). 
A snapshot  of the  industry 
The diagnostic  imaging  industry  has been global-and  dominated  by giant companies- 
since its inception.  Within  months of Wilhelm  Roentgen’s  1895 discovery  of x-rays, both 
General  Electric  in the United  States and Siemens  in Germany  were marketing  x-ray machines 
for diagnostic  purposes.  Since that time, the roster of industry giants has expanded  to include 
Philips (Netherlands),  Picker (U.S.-based, but acquired by Britain’s  General  Electric  Corporation 
in 1981), Toshiba  (Japan), and Hitachi  (Japan).  Other companies  have come and gone.  Small 
companies  have most often been the casualties,  but a number of giant corporations  in medical 
4 supplies,  pharmaceuticals,  and electronics  have made forays into diagnostic  imaging,  only  to 
later retreat.  Examples  include  Johnson  and Johnson,  Litton, Pfizer, Raytheon,  Searle, 
SmithKline,  Squibb, and Union Carbide. 
Table  1 shows the current top ten producers of diagnostic  imaging  equipment  and  their 
shares of the global  market,  compared  with the top ten in  1974.  GE, Siemens,  Toshiba,  Philips, 
Picker, and Hewlett-Packard,  the current top six, were all heavy hitters  in 1974 as well.  CGR 
(French) and EM1 (British),  two top-ten  companies  from  1974, have been absorbed  into GE. 
Today, the six largest companies  produce  equipment  across the six major  imaging  modalities. 
The four smaller  companies  in the top ten specialize  in particular  modalities:  U.S.-based Acuson, 
ATL, and Hewlett-Packard  excel in ultrasound  equipment,  and Israel’s Elscint  specializes  in 
nuclear  medicine  instruments.  U.S.-owned  companies  still dominate  the industry,  but there is a 
substantial  showing  from other countries,  including  Siemens (Germany),  Philips  (Netherlands), 
Toshiba  (Japan),  Hitachi  (Japan),  Picker (U.S.-based, but owned by the General  Electric 
Company  of Britain),  and Elscint  (Israel). 
Table 1: Worldwide  sales of the ten leading diagnostic  imaging companies  and 
total industry sales, millions  of current dollars,  1994 and 1974 
1994 Top 10  1974 Top 70 
Company  1994  1994 market  Company  1974  1974 market 
sales  share  sales  share 
General  Electric  1800  24.7%  General  Electric  90  22.5% 
Siemens  1700  23.3%  Picker  80  20.0% 
Hitachi  700  9.6%  Litton  Medical  55  13.8% 
Toshiba  700  9.6%  Philips  50  12.5% 
Picker  490  6.7%  CGR  Medical  40  10.0% 
Philips  410  5.6%  Siemens  40  10.0% 
Hewlett-Packard  260  3.6%  EMI  Ltd.  15  3.8% 
Acuson  230  3.2%  Toshiba  7  1.8% 
ATL  210  2.9%  Hewlett-Packard  5  1.3% 
Elscint  180  2.5%  Xonics  5  1.3% 
All  companies  7300  100.0%  400  100.0% 
Source: Medical  and Healtbcare  Marketplace  Guide  1975, 1996. 
The epochal  innovations  in the industry-in  particular,  those resulting  in the invention 
and commercialization  of new modalities---have  typically  been developed  by academic 
researchers  and small startup companies.  But the industry  giants have proven  successful  fast 
followers,  using their well established  marketing,  distribution,  and service networks  and their 
extensive  in-house  engineering  capacity  to enter and in many cases dominate  new markets.  In 
addition  to designing  their own products,  the giants have often  strengthened  their  hold on 
emerging markets  (and gained specialized  design capabilities)  by acquiring  smaller  companies 
(Mitchell  1988).  General  Electric  Medical  Systems, for instance,  absorbed  EMI’s CT scanner 
business in  1980, Nicolet  XRD in 1984, CGR in 1986, Ultrasonix’s  ultrasound  lines  in 1988, and the PET line of Sweden’s Scanditronix  in  1990 (in addition  to setting  up a variety ofjoint 
ventures  in Asia) (Medical  and Healthcare  Marketplace  Guide  1989, 199  1).  While GEMS has 
been a particularly  avid collector,  Siemens  acquired  Searle’s nuclear  medicine  business  in 198 1, 
Oxford Magnet (for MRI equipment)  in 1985, and ultrasound  company  Quantum  Med Systems 
in 1990.  Toshiba  bought the MRI division  of Diasonics  in  1989, and Applied  Superconetics, 
Inc., a magnet business,  in 1990 (Medical  and Healthcare  Marketplace  Guide  1996). 
Unfortunately,  tracking  the diagnostic  imaging industry  in standard  industrial  data 
sources is no simple  matter.  Until  1987, the Standard Industrial  Classification  (SIC) system 
placed diagnostic  imaging equipment  in SIC category  3693, “X-ray and electromedical 
equipment.”  In addition  to diagnostic  imaging  equipment,  this group included  machines  ranging 
from electroencephalographs  to pacemakers  to bronchoscopes.  By 1987, diagnostic  imaging 
products  amounted  to just  under half of the value of shipments  in this category  (U.S. Census 
Bureau  1990, Table 6a-2).  In 1987, SIC 3693 was split into SIC 3844, “X-ray apparatus  and 
tubes and related  irradiation  apparatus,”  and 3845, “Electromedical  and electrotherapeutic 
apparatus.”  Unfortunately  for the purposes of analyzing  diagnostic  imaging,  ultrasound  and MR 
scanners, which do not employ  ionizing  radiation,  were grouped in the latter category.  In 1987, 
these two product groups accounted  for about one-quarter  of the value of shipments  in SIC 3845, 
and one-third  of total diagnostic  imaging  product shipments.  As of 1994, ultrasound  and MR 
equipment  , still about one-quarter  of SIC 3845, had risen to almost half of diagnostic  imaging 
shipments  (computed  from U.S. International  Trade Administration  1995, Table  1.508,  and U.S. 
Census Bureau  1995, Table 2).  In 1994, diagnostic  imaging  equipment  as a whole  accounted  for 
just  under one-half  of total  sales in 3844 and 3845 combined. 
Since publicly  available  Census Bureau data are mostly organized  by SIC, the bottom 
line is that we can only examine  government  data about diagnostic  imaging  in combination  with 
other electromedical  equipment.  Private  sector industry analysts  have generated  far more 
detailed  estimates,  but their work resides in the fugitive  literature  of consultants’  reports.  Such 
reports are in general  expensive  and/or difficult  to access, poorly documented,  and often 
inconsistent.  The imperfect  solution  adopted  in this paper is to report results by SIC, 
supplemented  by estimates  from industry analysts  in the limited  instances  that these were readily 
available. 
Diagnostic  imaging equipment  is a relatively  small industry.  In 1994, U.S. diagnostic 
imaging equipment  manufacturers  shipped close to $5 billion  worth of equipment’.  Compare 
this with the other two industries  we have studied closely:  the machine  tool  industry shipped a 
roughly equal amount  that year; aircraft  engines  and engine  parts shipped  $17 billion,  But unlike 
these other industries,  diagnostic  imaging  has seen near-miraculous  growth.  In real terms, output 
has grown more than fourfold  since  1970, more than eightfold  since  1958.  Over this period, the 
industry has posted average annual  compound  growth rates of about six percent  (in real terms), 
roughly double that of the U.S. economy  as a whole.4  However, there is reason to believe  that 
the growth boom is over. 
’ This number totals the output  of SIC code 3844 (X-ray apparatus  and tubes) plus magnetic 
resonance  imaging  equipment  and ultrasound  scanning  devices.  Information  from U.S. Census 
Department. 
’ The Producer Price Index for machinery  and equipment  was used to adjust sales figures for 
inflation. 
6 From  growth  to stagnation 
Figures 1 and 2 trace the U.S. diagnostic  imaging  industry’s  meteoric  ascent.  Figure  1 
shows diagnostic  imaging  combined  with electromedical  instruments,  whereas Figure 2 offers 
estimates  of diagnostic  imaging  alone.  In its eightfold  expansion  since  1958, diagnostic  imaging 
has both benefited  from and contributed  to the upward arc of health  care spending  in general, 
which  grew sixfold  in real terms between  1960 and  1993 (U.S. Department  of Commerce  1995, 
Table  150, deflated  by chain-type  price index for services).  Key to the continued  growth in sales 
was the third party reimbursement  system in place in the United  States until the  1980s.  Between 
1940 and  1982, third party payers (insurance  companies  and government  agencies)  increased 
their share of health  care expenditures  from  I5 percent to 75 percent-and  90 percent of hospital 
expenditures  in particular  (Foote  1986, 1992).  During this time,  insurers paid for medical 
services on nearly a cost-plus basis, giving doctors and hospitals  little  incentive  to contain  costs. 
Though Medicare  did not cover most capital  costs, there was some pass-through  and hospitals 
could often  negotiate  suffkiently  high reimbursement  rates for procedures  to recover capital 
costs.  Private  insurers tended to follow  Medicare  in deciding  what to cover.  Cost-plus 
reimbursement  in health care poses interesting  parallels  with industries  in which the Defense 
Department  has been a major customer,  such as machine  tools (Forrant  1997) and jet  aircraft 
(Almeida  1997).  As with defense  contractors  in these other industries,  there was for a long time 
little  pressure for cost containment,  which may have left manufacturers  ill prepared for more 
recent waves of cost-cutting  and competitive  pressure. 
Up to the early  198Os,  radiologists  and other medical  specialists  controlled  equipment 
purchases as a professional  prerogative  and hospital  administrators  played  little  role.  Since 
availability  of advanced  technology  is an important  factor in a hospital’s general prestige  and 
ability  to attract topflight  doctors,  particularly  radiologists,  there was little  incentive  to restrain 
purchasing (Mitchell  1995, Foote  1992, Steinberg  and Cohen  1984, Tomsho  1996). 
7 Figure  1: Value  of shipments  for  U.S.  diagnostic  imaging 
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8 As Figures 1 and 2 show, the rise in diagnostic  imaging equipment  sales has not been 
unbroken.  Rather, periods of rapid growth have alternated  with periods of stagnation  or even 
short-term  decline.  Slowdowns  resulted  from some combination  of restraints  on health  care 
spending  and lags in equipment  innovation.  Prior to the last few years, the industry  saw three 
main periods of stagnant  sales. 
First,  in the  1960s  the U.S. market  for x-ray equipment  temporarily  reached  saturation. 
However, the creation  of Medicare  and Medicaid  as part of President  Lyndon Johnson’s  War on 
Poverty provided  a new infusion  of cash into health care.  The development  of CT scanners 
further revitalized  the market  in the  1970s. 
Second,  after nearly doubling  in a single year between  1976 and  1977, sales leveled  off 
again in the late  1970s.  Producers had overestimated  the CT market  and overproduced,  bringing 
down prices.  Equally  important,  the U.S. Health Care Financing  Administration  (HCFA), which 
handles  Medicare  reimbursement,  imposed  a requirement  that hospitals  seeking to acquire  costly 
equipment  must file a Certificate  of Need (CON) and obtain  approval.  Medical  diagnostic 
imaging  equipment  sales, especially  CT, declined  briefly.  However,  while hospitals  had to tile 
CON forms, outpatient  facilities  did not, spurring the growth of outpatient  CT imaging  facilities 
afftliated  with hospitals  or hospital-based  radiologists.  Since the procedures  were still covered 
by insurance  but the facilities  did not fall under governmental  capital  control  regulations,  the 
intent of the regulations  was effectively  undermined.  In addition,  the appearance  of MR 
machines  gave the industry an added boost.  Sales began to soar again. 
Third,  diagnostic  imaging equipment  sales drooped  in 1985-86.  The decrease  in sales 
was limited  to conventional  x-ray equipment,  CT scanners,  and digital  x-ray machines.  Once 
again, a combination  of reimbursement  jitters  and market  saturation  set in.  Digital  x-ray 
equipment  did not live up to its technical  billing,  and its sales were flat for the second half of the 
1980s.  CT scanners,  selling  for roughly  $1 million  per machine,  were reaching  the limits  of 
demand-especially  since MR imagers could offer crisper resolution  a similar  price. And in 
1983 HCFA implemented  a prospective  payment  system for patient  treatment.  Prospective 
payment  established  fixed reimbursement  tied to each patient’s  diagnosis,  replacing  cost-plus 
reimbursement  with. HCFA is the nation’s  single  largest health  care customer,  and its 
regulations  are typically  adopted  by Medicaid  and by private  insurers as well, so the potential 
reverberations  were enormous.  Private  insurers, pressed by corporate  clients  stung by the rising 
costs of providing  health  insurance  to their employees,  followed  suit.  By 1984 Secretary  of 
Health and Human Services Margaret Heckler  claimed  that the Reagan administration  had 
“broken  the back of the health care inflation  monster”  (Stein  1986, Reinhardt  1986). 
Heckler’s  boast was premature.  Hospitals  and doctors’  offices  soon found ways to at 
least partially  evade the system, and health  care industry concerns  about cost controls  abated 
somewhat.  Diagnostic  imaging  sales also recovered.  MRI purchasing  shifted to the now well- 
established  outpatient  radiology  facilities,  and capital  costs were accorded  lighter treatment 
under the new system than other hospital  costs (Mitchell  1995, Foote  1992, Trajtenberg  1990). 
MR and conventional  x-ray sales enjoyed  renewed  growth, but ultrasound  and nuclear  medical 
equipment,  fueled by technical  innovations,  led the growth spurt. 
The continuing  difficulty  in restraining  costs reflected  the political  and ethical  pressures 
to follow  up promising  research avenues  and to extend available  services to the widest possible 
numbers.  The public  has an ideal that no one should be denied  medical  care and that no expense 
should be spared in delivering  the finest care (Foote  1992).  Even though the ideal has always 
9 been violated  regularly  in practice,  politicians  are loath to contradict  the ideal too obviously,  so 
it is not surprising that previous cost control  plans seem to have been rather porous.  Given that 
CT and MRI represented  such dramatic  breakthroughs,  it is not surprising  that the law failed  to 
curb physician  and public demand  (Foote  1992, Trajtenberg  1990). 
What about the industry’s  post- 1992 slump?  This recent  flattening  of sales reflects  sales 
losses in almost every modality,  according  to Biomedical  Business  International  (Standard  and 
Poor’s  1995).  Industry analysts  have pointed  to overcapacity  in a number of modalities, 
particularly  MRI (Health  Industry  Today  1  O/94, Naj  1994, Standard and Poor’s  1995, 1996). 
Actual or anticipated  reimbursement  changes  have clearly  had an impact as well. An obvious 
explanation  for the  1993-94 sputtering  of diagnostic  imaging equipment  sales is thefrisson  due 
to President  Clinton’s  health care proposal-which  was, of course, never enacted.  But other 
changes that attracted  far less public attention  were at least as important.  In 199  1, Medicare 
began to extend prospective  payment  to hospitals’  equipment.  Whereas earlier  Medicare  paid 
hospitals  for actual costs minus a 15 percent  discount,  the new system, phased in over a number 
of years, pays flat fees based on diagnosis  (Standard  and Poor’s  1992).  Moreover,  in 1993 new 
legislation  proposed by Congressman  Pete Stark of California  partially  plugged the diagnostic 
imaging center  loophole,  by placing  limits on physicians’  ability  to refer patients  to imaging 
centers in which they hold an equity  stake (Brean Murray, Foster 1996). 
In short, the historical  and recent fortunes of the U.S. diagnostic  imaging  industry  have 
ridden primarily  on two factors: the pacing of technological  innovations,  and the nature of health 
care financing.  Figures 3A-3D trace U.S. and world sales of diagnostic  imaging  equipment, 
broken  down by modality.  Unlike  Figures  1 and 2, these graphs depict  sales by all producers, 
not just  U.S.-based ones.  Figures 3A and 3B show U.S.  sales  by  all  producers  in constant 
dollars,  and sales in each modality  as percentage  of the total.  Figures 3C and 3D show the same 
two series for world  sales  (for which we were not able to obtain  as many years of data).  The 
impact of success waves of innovation  is clear.  CT and ultrasound  scanners  first made a major 
splash in 1974, and MRI appeared  in 1983.  From 90 percent of the U.S. market  in  1972, x-ray 
equipment  declined  to just  above 30 percent  in the  1990s.  The U.S. market  and the broader 
world market have followed  very similar  patterns. 
FIGURES  3A-3D ABOUT HERE] 
Given the historical  pattern driven by technology  and third-party  reimbursement,  should 
we view the slowdown  since  1992 as another  temporary  halt, or a long-term  plateau?  Assuredly, 
it would be unwise to predict  an end to innovation  in diagnostic  imaging.  But most innovation 
in the field has had a moderately  long incubation  period.  For example,  ten years passed from the 
construction  of the first nuclear  medicine  machine  to the creation  of a marketable  product; the 
CT scanner took  five years from invention  to commercialization  (Mitchell  1988).  Despite some 
analysts’ excitement  over emerging  advances  in MRI (Standard  and Poor’s  1997), in our view 
the only innovation  currently  visible  on the horizon  that seems likely  to have an impact  similar  in 
scale to the appearance  of a new modality  is the PACS. 
As for reimbursement,  the federal  government  continues  to clamp down bit by bit on 
health  care costs, including  equipment  costs.  But even if government’s  success in containing 
health care costs remains  limited,  the spread of health  maintenance  organizations  (HMOs) and 
managed care in the private  sector has begun to significantly  squeeze reimbursement  rates. 
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Figure  3A: U.S. sales of five diagnostic  imaging  modalities  in millions 




q  Nuclear medicine 
n  Ultrasound 
ECT 
0  X-ray 
Figure  38:  Five diagnostic  imaging  modalities  as a percentage  of the 





i  60% 
ui 






a  30% 
10% 
EI Nuclear  medicin 
. 
Note: X-ray and CT sales  imputed,  1988-89. 
Sources:  1972-87 from Trajtenberg  1990; 1988-89 from National  Electrical  Manufacturers  Assoc., 











boo  s 
1000 
0 
Figure  3C: World sales of five diagnostic  imaging  modalities  in 
millions  of 1994 dollars,  selected  years 1974-1996 
Irn I I I I I I I I  I lrri  1 
piix 
q  Nuclear  medicine 
Figure  3D: Five diagnostic  imaging  modalities  as a percent8 




I  70% 
t  60% 
9 
8 
L  50% 
B 
E  40% 
8 





e of the 
EI Nuclear  medicine 
Note: CT combined  with X-ray  in 1974.  X-ray interpolated,  1985 and 1988.  1995 estimated,  1996 
forecast. 
Source:  Medical  and Healthcare  Marketplace  Guide,  publishers  variously  International  Bio-Medical 
Information  Service  (1974-1988),  MLR Biomedical  Information  Services  (1989-1990),  IDD 
Enterprises  (1991-1996). Between  1986 and  1996, HMOs spread from  10 percent  to 30 percent  of the insured population 
(Pham  1997), and they have become  much more aggressive in limiting  payments  to providers. 
The effects  of this latest wave of cost containment  are profound,  and appear likely  to 
deepen  further in coming  years. For diagnostic  imaging equipment  in particular,  the implications 
are grave. In addition  to the direct  impact of managed care, purchaser  uncertainty  has escalated. 
One response by health  care providers  has been to turn to the market  for second-hand  and 
reconditioned  equipment.  Large hospital  chains are now buying refurbished  systems, which 
previously  were only marketed  to rural and Third  World buyers.  GE markets  its own used 
equipment;  other companies  such as Picker are offering  to overhaul  machines  from other 
companies,  as well as their own.  Used MRIs can cost $.85-$1.1 million,  rather than $1.5$2 
million,  used CT scanners can cost $245-470,000,  rather than $700850,000  (Scott  1995, 
Tomsho  1996).  “This was a market  where you bought something  new, you bought the bells  and 
whistles,  and you replaced  it every five years,” commented  Robert McGee, president  of 
Serviscope  Corp., an equipment-services  company  in Wallingford,  Connecticut.  “Now it’s more 
like the airline  industry.  With proper maintenance  and proper upgrades, equipment  does not 
need to be replaced every five years unless there is some clinical  reason (Scott  1995).  Smaller 
hospitals  are starting to contract  with mobile  MRI units that make regular visits (Health  Industry 
Today,  10/94).  And hospitals  are also simply deferring  replacement  of diagnostic  imaging 
equipment  (Lehman  Brothers  1996, Standard and Poor’s  1997). 
With breakneck  rates of equipment  acquisition  through  most of the  1980s followed  by 
stringent  cost pressures in the  199Os,  the current  market appears to be saturated.  Though  our 
time series for U.S. output and demand  extend only to 1994 (Figures  1,3A-B),  a Picker 
executive  reported that the market  for diagnostic  imaging products declined  25 percent  in the 
following  two years ( 1994- 1996) (IW, 5/6/96).  General  Electric  Medical  Systems, the industry 
leader, announced  a restructuring  plan in 1993 in response to the downturn  (Health  Zndustry 
Today,  7/93),  and Hewlett-Packard  followed  suit a few years later (Hewlett-Packard  web site, 
1996). *** 
But in addition  to innovation  and reimbursement,  a third factor will prove increasingly 
important:  international  markets.  While U.S. imaging equipment  sales-which  currently 
account  for about 40 percent of sales world-wide-may  be leveling  off, world sales are poised to 
take off.  Already,  between  1989 and  1994, exports climbed  from 32 percent  to 39 percent  of x- 
ray and electromedical  shipments  by U.S. producers  (U.S. International  Trade Administration 
1995).  Consultants  Frost and Sullivan  projected  a near-doubling  of the world market between 
1993 and 2000 (Standard  and Poor’s  1994).  Most of this growth will not take place in Western 
Europe or Japan  since, as in the United  States, the markets of these countries  are relatively 
saturated (and the national  health  systems of Western Europe have placed strict controls  on new 
equipment  purchases).  Instead, rapid demand  growth is likely  in Asia, Latin America,  and 
Eastern Europe.  For instance,  between  1991 and  1993, U.S. exports to China  of diagnostic 
ultrasound  equipment  more than doubled;  exports of MRI machines  increased  a staggering 
fourteen-fold  (Chan  1994a).  And for overall  growth in imports of U.S.-made medical 
equipment,  China  is actually  at the low end among Asian countries  (Chan  1994b).  The key 
question,  then, is to what extent  U.S. producers  are well positioned  to maintain  and expand their 
world market  share.  We will return to this question  below. 
11 2) Outsourcing  and  downsizing  by U.S. diagnostic  imaging  equipment  producers 
As cost reduction  pressures gradually  mounted  from the late  1970s onward,  diagnostic  imaging’ 
equipment  manufacturers  responded  with a variety of strategies.  As of the early  198Os,  most U.S. 
manufacturers  still voiced  the view that price would not be a significant  determinant  of market 
share as non-price  competition  (based on image quality,  product  features,  reliability,  service) 
would dominate  (Steinberg  and Cohen  1984).  But by the  1990s  efforts to reduce purchasing 
prices were in full swing.  Such efforts  included  a variety  of design changes.  But U.S. producers 
also sought to reduce production  costs by drawing on a by now familiar  repertoire  of tools  of 
corporate  restructuring,  including  outsourcing  and downsizing. 
Design-based  cost reduction  strategies  have taken  several forms: 
l Scale down equipment.  Less powerful  and versatile  machines  have long been the 
standard  in Asia, but United  States (and to a lesser extent European)  producers  historically  have 
targeted a premium  market. This is starting to change.  By selectively  removing  less needed or 
non-reimbursed  functions  from the equipment,  Siemens lowered the price of its Magnetom  Open 
MRI to $1 million.  U.S. manufacturers  are now trying to market  mid and low end MRI systems 
to first-time  buyers and imaging  facilities  that need backup systems,  Many of these are designed 
only to scan specific  sites and deliver  lower quality  whole-body  images.  Still, smaller  systems 
require less space and installation  costs, which can be important  considerations.  Philips  has 
managed  to reduce the size of its high-end  system so that it weighs only  8,000 pounds, compared 
to 12,000 pounds for a comparable  GE model  (Health  Industry  Today,  10/94).  But GE Medical 
Systems (GEMS) and other companies  have also introduced  low- and mid-range  models  of MR 
and CT scanners (Morone  1993). 
l Design machines  to increase  throughput  of patients.  Fonar introduced  an MRI that can 
scan four people  in quick succession.  Philips  introduced  an x-ray machine  that can pivot 
between two rooms, reducing  idle time (Naj  1994). 
l Market high-end  machines  as a way to reduce other costs. GE is developing  an MRI 
that would give surgeons real-time  3-D images as they guide surgical  instruments  through  small 
incisions,  allowing  them to avoid nerves, blood  vessels, and organs.  This less invasive  form of 
surgery would save money by minimizing  risk of complications  and long hospital  stays (Naj 
1994; Health  Indwry  Today,  10/94).  Producers are working  on a number of other,  less 
ambitious  multi-purpose  machines  and enhancements  to image quality  to pursue a value added 
strategy, rather than going an economy  route (Health  kzdustry  Today,  9195, p.9; Health  Industry 
Today,  5195, p. 11).  Moreover,  manufacturers  are promoting  picture  archiving  communications 
systems (PACS) as a way to cut down on diagnostic  imaging costs themselves  (IW 5/96).  One 
hospital  using a Fuji PACS that replaces  film with computer  storage reports savings of $100,000 
per year. 
l Enhance  the capabilities  of the less expensive  modalities,  so that they can perform 
functions  that currently  require more costly equipment,  Some believe  that improvements  in 
12 ultrasound  imaging,  including  future development  of real-time  3-D imaging,  will  pose  a 
challenge  to CT and MRI, since ultrasound  systems are a fraction  of the cost of the other two 
(Kc?alth Industry  Today,  July  1994). 
Of course, the  1980s and  1990s were also a time when U.S. corporations  in general,  and 
manufacturers  in particular,  were using outsourcing,  delayering,  and downsizing  to shrink 
workforces  and drive down production  costs (Harrison  1994). Thus, it is not surprising  that 
restructuring  aimed  at increasing  efficiency  diffused  among U.S. diagnostic  imaging  producers. 
The two U.S.-based imaging  equipment  manufacturers  under study by the author  and 
others took two different  approaches  to outsourcing.  One of the two companies-call  it 
Company  A-moved  strongly toward sourcing  components  from outside  suppliers.  Beginning  in 
the late  1980s and continuing  into the  199Os,  Company  A outsourced  thousands  of parts, and laid 
off about almost 40 percent of its production  workforce.  Company  A began to outsource  some 
design work as well, reducing  the size of its engineering  workforce.  Company  B, on the other 
hand, has not outsourced  components  to anything  like the same extent.  Instead, Company  B has 
outsourced  workers, by using temporary  agency workers to staff about one-quarter  of its 
manufacturing  positions. 
One indicator  of outsourcing  is the growing share of value of  U.S. x-ray equipment 
shipments  that is accounted  for by parts and accessories,  rather than  finished  equipment.  The 
share of parts and accessories  (excluding  tubes, which the industry  giants continue  to produce 
themselves)  rose from seven percent  in  1982 to eleven  percent  in 1987 (U.S. Census Bureau 
1984, 1990).  (Unfortunately,  published  1992 Census of Manufactures  reports did not include  the 
relevant  information.) 
Outsourcing  also offers one possible  interpretation  of broader  industry employment  and 
output trends.  After  1977, total employment  in the x-ray and electromedical  industries  more 
than doubled, but the production  workforce  remained  essentially  unchanged  (Figure 4).  From a 
peak of 61 percent of the industry workforce  in the early  1970s  production  workers had tumbled 
to 46 percent by twenty years later.  Inflation-corrected  value added per employee,  marched 
steadily  upward from $60,000 in 1967 to $123,000 in 1992 (in  1994 dollars),  with the most rapid 
increase  taking  place during the  1980s. 
A number of possible  explanations  are consistent  with the employment  pattern.  In 
addition  to outsourcing,  it could (and almost  surely does, in part) result from automation, 
offshore  production,  or simply the increasingly  technical  nature of the industry.  Our limited  case 
study evidence  suggests that outsourcing  interacts  with these other processes.  For example, 
outsourcing  reinforces the shift to a more technical  workforce.  In Company  A, the shop floor of 
twenty years ago swarmed with machine  operators,  machinists,  and semi-skilled  assemblers, 
building  equipment  more or less from scratch.  Today, a much smaller  number of workers 
assemble  and test sub-assemblies.  Since testing is such a large part of the job,  most have at least 
some technical  training.  The net result is more high-quality  jobs,  but fewer  high-quality  jobs  for 
people without  higher education.  Shop floor testing and technical  jobs  typically  require at least 
some community  college,  and engineering  jobs  require at least a four year degree. 
13 Figure  4: Total  employment  and  production  workers  in  U.S. 
x-ray  and  electromedical  industries,  thousand&  1959-94 
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Sources: U.S. Office  of Technology  Assessment  1984, Table 4; U.S. Census Bureau  1984 (Table 
1  a), 1990 (Table  1  a-2), 1995 (Table  1  a).  Total  employment  in  1993 and  1994 imputed  from 
County  Business  Patterns  (IJnited  States),  1993 and  1994, Table  lb. 
Some outsourcing-for  example,  purchases of circuit  boards, metal cabinets,  or 
computer  monitors-shifts  production  outside the diagnostic  imaging  industry  altogether.  But 
for accounting  purposes, production  of diagnostic  imaging-specific  subassemblies  stays within 
the diagnostic  imaging  industry,  simply  shifting  production  to smaller  companies.  This would 
lead us to expect smaller  firm sizes in the industry. 
Observed changes  in firm size are consistent  with this expectation,  though other 
explanations  are also possible.  Tables  5 and 6 display the changes.  Firm sizes grew from the 
late  1960s to the early  198Os,  boosting  the number of employees  per company  (Figure 5) and 
reducing  the proportion  of total industry employment  in small establishments  (Figure 6).  From 
the early  1980s onward, the direction  reversed and firm sizes diminished.  The numbers appear 
to reflect  a history  in which first larger companies  grew their workforces  by acquiring  smaller 
companies  and expanding  market  share, and then with outsourcing  in the  1980s  the process 
reversed: the large companies  shrank, and a growing fringe of small companies  emerged  to 
supply sub-assemblies.  However, the downturn  in firm size could also simply reflect  entry of 
small competitors,  rather than suppliers.  More definitive  explanations  of industry changes  in 
employment  and firm size await additional  case study research. 
14 Figure  5: Average  number  of employees  per  company  in 
U.S.  xay  and  electromedical,  1987-1992 
Year 
Sources: Calculated  by authors  from U.S. Office of Technology  Assessment  1984, Tables 4 and 
13; U.S. Census Bureau  1984 (Table  la),  1990 (Table  la-2),  1995 (Table  la). 
Figure  6: Percentage  of diagnostic  imaging 
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Source: U.S. Department  of Commerce,  County  Business  Patterns,  &  years,  Table  1  b. 
The effect  of outsourcing  and firm size changes on production  workers’ wages has been 
ambiguous.  Figure 7 tracks these wages over time.  Production  workers’  wages in the x-ray and 
electromedical  industry are considerably  more volatile  than average manufacturing  wages, since 
they are affected  greatly by a few union contracts  and the fates of a few companies.  Their  wages 
dove in  1980-8 1 recession,  but they managed  to work their way out of that hole as the economy 
expanded  once more.  (The  1980-81 wage decline  probably  is due at least in part to 
compositional  changes--such  as greater layoffs  of high-paid  than of low-paid  workers-rather 
than simply a drop in the wages paid to individuals.)  The real story is not that sudden drop, but 
rather the long-term  stagnation  of wages, which  fluctuated  around $13.50 an hour (in  1994 
dollars)  as of the early  197Os,  and around $13.00 an hour in the late  1980s and early  1990s. 
Stagnation,  of course, was also the fate of U.S. manufacturing  wages in general,  and indeed U.S. 
wages in general.  Over the  1970s and  198Os,  U.S. workers  lost ground relative  to their 
counterparts  in Europe and Japan (Freeman  1994, Table  1.2).  Compared  to manufacturing 
workers as a group, production  workers  in x-ray and electromedical  equipment  have done 
15 relatively  well.  Meanwhile,  the real hourly  wages of non-production  (professional,  technical, 
and managerial)  workers in the industry,  which had hovered  between  $19 and $2 1 from  1967 
and  1982, climbed  to $25 between  1982 and  1992 (not shown;  U.S. Census Bureau  1984,1990, 
1995; all figures in  1994 dollars;  calculations  assume these employees  worked 40 hours per 
week). 
Figure  7: Hourly  wages  of production  workers  (1994  dollars) 
in  U.S.  x-ray  and  electromedical  and  all  anufacturing, 
1997-1992 
Year 
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Source: Computed  by authors  from U.S. Census Bureau  1984 (Table  la),  1990 (Table  la-2), 
1995 (Table  la). 
What, if anything,  can we conclude  about the impact of outsourcing  on production 
worker wages?  Unfortunately,  we cannot  conclude  much.  Based on available  data, we do not 
have a reliable  way to distinguish  between  supplying  and purchasing  companies  within  the 
diagnostic  imaging  industry, and we have no way of knowing  what businesses  outside  of the 
industry are its suppliers. Within  x-ray and electromedical  manufacturing,  smaller  businesses  do 
tend to pay lower average wages (establishments  employing  500 to 999 employees  pay the 
average employees  25 percent more per year than those with  10 to  19 employees  [computed  by 
authors from cowlry  Business Patterns,  1994,  Table  1  b]).  But data on wages by firm size 
combine  production  and non-production  workers, so this wage gap may just  result from higher 
proportions  of (highly  paid) non-production  workers at larger companies.  Looking  at wage 
change within  the industry over time,  we see that during the period of outsourcing,  production 
worker wages within  x-ray and electromedical  were climbing  from their early  1980s low, and 
pulling  ahead of the manufacturing  average, though  they have not yet re-attained  their  1970s 
peak.  This would be expected  if low-end  production  work was being shed, but the unanswered 
question  is who was now performing  this low-end work, and at what wages.  Reaching 
conclusions  about the wage effects of outsourcing  will require additional  case study work. 
Downsizing  and outsourcing  affect  managers  and engineers  as well as production 
workers.  The stated purposes of restructuring  are to allow companies  to focus on their core 
competencies,  and to outsource  where other producers can do the job  better or at lower cost. 
16 “Our goal is to be competitive,”  commented  one top Company  A manager.  “That means 
everything  is on the table.”  However,  some managers interviewed  at companies  A and B 
expressed the fear that excessive  outsourcing  and downsizing  may harm the long-run 
competitive  strength of their respective  companies.  At Company  A, managers  complained  that 
excessive  outsourcing  has resulted  in quality  problems.  “Quality  is a continual  struggle,” 
commented  one manager.  “It is clear why: we expect a lot and don’t want to pay much.  The 
supplier base is under pressure to give on the price to get in the game.”  Some also worry that 
outsourcing  results in the loss of in-house  engineering  competencies:  “We’re just  outsourcing 
and outsourcing  and outsourcing.  We used to have a lot of knowledge  about the products.  Once 
you outsource,  you lose the competencies.” 
A number of Company  A managers  commented  that repeated  rounds of downsizing  and 
escalating  performance  goals had exhausted  the remaining  management  and engineering 
workforce.  “The business is..  in the red zone on the tachometer,”  commented  one.  He added 
that a certain  amount  of redundancy  and slack is necessary  to allow  room for organizational 
memory and learning.  These concerns  about organizational  learning  offer some support for 
Lazonick and O’Sullivan’s  ( 1996) hypothesis  that insufficient  organizational  integration  of 
various  layers of the workforce  has weakened  the competitive  advantage  of U.S. manufacturers. 
Company  B has made far more strenuous  efforts to retain  its workforce,  keeping 
company-wide  turnover among permanent  employees  down around five percent.  But part of 
their formula  for doing so has been to buffer  long-term  employees  with a ring of temporary 
agency workers.  This strategy brings its own contradictions.  One Company  B manager 
commented  on tension  between  regular and contract  employees.  She added, “It may not be such 
a good idea to have contract  employees.  You want to have people you can count on”-given 
quality  goals and extensive  training  requirements. 
Have outsourcing  and downsizing  actually  weakened  the competitiveness  of U.S.-based 
diagnostic  imaging  companies?  To begin to answer that question,  let us examine  the U.S. 
industry in international  context. 
3) Globalization  and the rise of Japanese  producers 
As we commented  earlier,  diagnostic  imaging was born as an international  industry. 
General Electric  and Siemens  were both present  at the creation  of commercial  x-ray machines  in 
1896.  As of  1958, the U.S. diagnostic  imaging  market was dominated  by these two, along with 
U.S.-based Picker and Westinghouse,  and the Dutch company  Philips.  Together  the five 
companies  controlled  70 to 75 percent  of the American  market.  Thirty  years later in 1988, GE, 
Siemens, Picker (now owned by the British  GEC), and Philips  controlled  70 percent  of the U.S. 
market; only  Westinghouse  had dropped  out (Mitchell  1988). 
Despite this apparent  stability  among  industry  leaders, globalization  has in fact increased 
markedly.  Consider  two indices  of globalization.  First, Figure 8 tracks the ratio of imports plus 
exports to U.S. domestic  production,  for the x-ray and electromedical  industry and for all goods. 
This index computes  a ratio of global  production  and consumption  to domestic  production. 
(Note that this index can exceed  100 percent,  since only exports,  not imports, are a subset of 
domestic  production.)  Diagnostic  imaging  has not kept up with the blistering  pace of 
globalization  for all goods--which  saw this ratio  more than triple between  1979 and  1994. 
17 Nonetheless,  globalization  in x-ray and electromedical  products also surged, more than doubling 
over the same period. 
Figure  8: Sum  of imports  and  exports  as a percentage  of 
U.S.  domestic  production,  x-raylelectromedical  and  all 
goods,  1979-l  994 
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Sources: U.S. Office  of Technology  Assessment,  1984, Table  18, and U.S. International  Trade 
Administration,  1995, Table  1508. 
Second,  Table 2 shows the breakdown  of diagnostic  imaging equipment  sold in the 
United  States by nationality  of ownership  of the company.  Between  1958 and  1994, sales by 
U.S.-owned companies  tumbled  from three-quarters  of total  equipment  sales to just  over one- 
third, with the difference  going roughly equally  split between  European  and Japanese 
companies.  However,  this table does not accurately  reflect  changes  in the location  of 
production.  Most of the rise in the European  share results from the purchase  of U.S. companies 
by European  ones.  Most notable  among these purchases was the  1981 acquisition  of Picker  by 
GEC.  However, Philips  and Siemens  also absorbed  U.S. producers:  for example,  Philips 
purchased  Rohe  Scientific,  the ultrasound  company  that perfected  the gray scale technology,  in 
! 976; Siemens acquired  .A.merican  producers  of  equipment  for ultrasound  (Searle)  and nuclear 
medicine  (Quantum)  producers  (Friar  1986, Mitchell  1988).  Thus, the rising European  share 
largely tracks continuing  U.S.-based production  under new ownership.  (For that matter, U.S. 
companies  have also acquired  European  ones, as when GE Medical  Systems absorbed France’s 
Thomson-CGR  in 1987.)  On the other hand, the sextupled Japanese  share understates  the 
growing portion  of production  taking  place in Japan, since, as will be discussed  further below, 
Japanese  companies  produce  increasing  amounts  of equipment  sold by U.S.-owned  businesses. 
Table 2: Percentage  of diagnostic  imaging equipment sales in the United States, by 
nationality  of OWDe&ip of company,  1958,1986,  and 1994 
Nationality  of ownership  19.58  1986  1994 
United  States  75%  45%  37% 
Europe  20%  45%  39% 
Japan  3%  6%  21% 
Other  2%  4%  3% 
18 Note:  1994 just  gives percentage  of sales within top  10 companies  (which  accounted  for 9 1 
percent of industry  sales) 
Sources:  Mitchell  1988,  Figure  8-4;  Medical  and  Healthcare  Marketplace  Guide  1996,  p.223. 
Table  3 shows  imports,  exports,  and  trade  balances  for the  U.S.  x-ray  and  electromedical 
industry.  It is difficult  to discern  any  long  term  trend.  However,  between  1989 and  1994 
(though  the  years  in between  are  not  shown  in the  table),  the  U.S.  x-ray  industry  has  consistently 
run  a trade  deficit,  whereas  the  I_J.  S. electromedical  industry  has  consistently  posted  a somewhat 
larger  trade  surplus. 
Table  3:  Imports,  exports,  and  trade  balances  in U.S.  diagnostic  imaging 
In  1994  dollars,  1979-1994 
X-RAY  AND  ELECTROMEDICAL 
Value  of imports  (millions  of  1994  dollars) 
Value  of exports  (millions  of  1994  dollars) 
Trade  balance  (millions  of  1994  dollars) 
1979  1983  1989 
449  816  1978 
1169  1297  2277 





X-RAY  APPARATUS  (SIC  3844) 
Value  of  imports  (millions  of  1994  dollars)  936  1131 
Value  of exports  (millions  of  1994  dollars)  562  987 
Trade  balance  (millions  of  1994  dollars)  -374  -144 
ELECTROMEDICAL  (SIC  3845) 
Value  of  imports  (millions  of  1994  dollars)  1042  1308 
Value  of exports  (millions  of  1994  dollars)  1716  2820 
Trade  balance  (millions  of  1994  dollars)  673  1512 
Sources:  U.S.  Office  of Technology  Assessment,  1984,  Table  18, and  U.S.  International  Trade 
Administration,  1995,  Table  1508. 
How  are  these  deficits  and surpluses distributed  across trading  partners?  As Table 4 
demonstrates,  the largest source of imports  and  exports of  diagnostic  imaging  and related 
equipment  is the  15member  European  Community.  Second is an east Asian market consisting 
of Japan and the nearby newly industrializing  countries  (NICs) of Taiwan,  Hong Kong, Korea, 
and Singapore.  In x-ray equipment,  the United  States runs substantial  trade deficits  with Europe 
and Japan.  (60 percent  of the trade imbalance  with Europe results from exchange  with 
Germany,  and most of the rest from trade with the Netherlands-pointing  to the importance  of 
Siemens and Philips  in the U.S. market.)  In electromedical  equipment,  the category that 
includes MRI and ultrasound  scanners,  the United States is a net exporter to Europe, but a net 
importer  from Japan.  Adding the two industry  categories  together  yields  a trade deficit  of $24 
million  with Europe, and a deficit  of $297 million  with Japan. 
Also noteworthy  is the high level of cross-trade--exports  and  imports of equipment 
to/from the same region.  This points to the need to understand  which companies  and countries 
are dominating  which activities  within the diagnostic  imaging  equipment  industry, which we 
19 cannot determine  from these aggregate data.  Such  detailed  information  could  tell  us a great  deal 
about  the  loci  of learning  and  sustained  competitive  advantage  across  companies  and  nations, 
Table  4:  U.S.  trade  in diagnostic  imaging  equipment  by  partner,  1992 
In  millions  of  1992  dollars 
Region 




East  Asia  NlCs 
South  America 
Other 
X-ray  apparatus  and  tubes  Electromedical  equipment 
(SIC  3844)  (SIC  3845) 
Exports  Imports  Surplus/  Expotts  Imports  sulplus/ 
Value  Share  Value  Share  Deficit  Value  Share  Value  Share  Deficit 
118  14.9  65  5.6  53  247  10.9  127  5.6  120 
284  35.9  814  70.5  -530  991  44.0  485  38.0  506 
120  15.2  218  18.9  -98  298  13.2  497  38.9  -199 
81  10.3  4  0.3  77  242  10.7  80  6.2  162 
70  8.8  0  0.0  70  89  4.0  0  0.0  89 
118  14.9  53  4.6  65  389  17.2  88  6.9  301 
Total  791  100  1155  100  -364  2255  100  1277  100  978 
Source: U.S. International  Trade Administration  1995. 
Even without  additional  details,  these trade figures focus attention  on Japan.  Japanese 
companies  participating  in the U.S. diagnostic  imaging  market  include  Toshiba  and Hitachi,  but 
also “Shimadzu,  JEOL, Mitsubishi,  Matsushita,  Aloka and at least  15 others” (Mitchell  1988, 
p.8.4).  As Mitchell  (1988) describes,  Japan-based  production  has become  increasingly  important 
in the U.S. market  in four ways: 
a) Supply of components-a  role played by Japanese  firms since the  1950s. 
b) Supply of systems to be sold under U.S. and European companies’ labels.  Japanese 
companies  have sold systems under these terms since the late  1960s.  In some niche  markets the 
Japanese  presence  is sizable: for instance,  the Acoma X-Ray Industry Company,  Ltd. produced 
one-quarter  of all x-ray mammography  systems sold in the United  States in the late  1980+all  of 
which were marketed  under U.S. and European  labels. 
c) Direct and indirect distribution  of Japanese companies’  branded products. 
Toshiba  was the first Japanese  company  to set up its own sales force in the United  States in 
1976, but other companies  have since followed  suit 
d) Joint ventures  between Japanese and U.S. or European companies.  General 
Electric  formed the Tokyo-based  Yokogawa  Medical  Systems (YMS) joint  venture  with 
Yokogawa  Electrical  Works in 198 1 (Tichy  and Sherman  1994).  According  to Mitchell  (1988, 
p.8.Q  YMS (now GEYMS) manufactures  most of GE’s ultrasound  products,  much of its CT 
product line, and some MR products as well.  (GE also has joint  ventures and subsidiaries  in 
20 China,  India, Korea, and Vietnam.)  Picker created  a joint  venture  with Toray  Industries and Fuji 
Electric  Company,  and that joint  venture now produces most of Picker’s  ultrasound  and nuclear 
medicine  equipment.  Siemens, as well, has launched  a joint  venture  with Asahi  in the late 
1980s.  The reverse phenomenon  has also occurredfor  example,  Toshiba  acquired  the MRI 
division  of U.S.-based Diasonics  in 1989 after selling  Diasonics  machines  under its label  for a 
number of years-but  is far less common  (Medical  and Healthcare  Marketplace  Guide  1996). 
Beyond the particular  forms by which Japanese  producers  have expanded  production,  it is 
important  to note that these companies  have also gradually  widened  the range of modalities  in 
which they produce, and have expanded  their  product lines both up- and downmarket. 
Preliminary  visits to three Japanese  diagnostic  imaging  companies  revealed  significant 
differences  in the organization  of production,  relative  to U.S.-based companies.  Among them 
were: 
l A higher degree of vertical  integration  of production,  despite  substantial  recent 
movement  in the direction  of outsourcing.  One Company  A manager,  while describing 
his company’s  outsourcing,  noted that “The Japanese  are the antithesis  of this--they 
make everything.”  The Japanese  managers,  on the other hand, reported  high levels of 
outsourcing  by their standards.  It will require additional  case study work to adequately 
compare  the degree of vertical  disintegration  in the two settings. 
l Closer,  longer-term,  more consultative  relationships  with suppliers. 
l Standard Japanese  practices  of lifetime  employment,  substantial  on-the-job  training, 
and opportunities  for production  worker input into management  decision-making. 
Engineering  managers  in one company  expressed  low opinions  of Japanese  companies’ 
capacity  for innovation.  But Mitchell  (1988) warns against  dismissing  the Japanese  diagnostic 
imaging  industry as imitative,  noting that many Japanese  companies  have strong in-house 
capacity,  and that technology  transfer has flowed  from Japan as well  as to it.  Japanese  academic 
researchers  began studying x-rays in 1898, only a few years after their European  and U.S. 
counterparts.  Shimadzu began commercial  manufacture  of x-ray machines  in  1911, followed 
shortly thereafter  by Toshiba.  Japanese  diagnostic  imaging equipment  manufacturers,  like 
Japanese  manufacturers  in other products,  have a reputation  for high quality  and extremely 
efficient  production  processes.  From available  evidence,  it is not clear what is the relative 
importance  of quality,  price, and innovation  in explaining  the inroads  gained by Japanese 
manufacturers. 
Other  Asian  companies  have more recently  begun  following  the lead of Japanese  imaging 
equipment  manufacturers.  For example,  Medison,  the first manufacturer  of diagnostic 
ultrasound  equipment  in South Korea, saw sales rocket  up at 60 percent  per year between  1986 
and 1995, fueled by the Korean government’s  drive to modernize  its health  care system 
(Dongsuh  Securities  1996).  Meanwhile,  General  Electric  and Philips  have also entered  the 
Korean imaging  equipment  market through joint  ventures (with Samsung, in the case of GE). 
And China’s  booming  market  for diagnostic  imaging equipment  is served by joint  ventures 
established  by GE, Siemens, Toshiba,  Hitachi,  Hewlett-Packard,  and numerous  others (Chan 
1994a). 
21 Despite the growing Japanese  and other Asian presence  in diagnostic  imaging,  we 
certainly  cannot  flatly  assert that U.S. companies  are losing the competitive  battle.  The U.S. 
trade balance  in x-ray and electromedical  equipment  remains  positive  and in fact rather large.  . 
GEMS, which held a 22.5 percent  market share in 1974, continues  to lead the market with a 24.7 
percent share in 1994 (though of course the latter number  includes  GE’s Asian and European 
joint  ventures and subsidiaries).  However,  second-tier  U.S. producers  have lost ground.  The 
five U.S. companies  among the top ten producers  in 1974 accounted  for 60 percent of global 
sales; the five U.S. topten  companies  in 1994 account  for 41 percent.  (This counts  Picker as a 
U.S. company  both times despite  its intervening  acquisition  by a British multinational.  If we 
exclude Picker  in 1994, the U.S. share drops to 34 percent of total  industry  sales; as Table 2 
shows, this is 37 percent of topten  company  sales.)  Meanwhile,  Japanese  top-ten companies’ 
share of total  industry  sales expanded  from two percent  in 1974 to  19 percent  in 1994.  It would 
require more detailed  case study analysis  to determine  the extent to which U.S. dominance  is 
likely  to continue  to erode. 
4) Organizational  integration  in U.S. diagnostic  imaging companies 
Lazonick  and O’Sullivan  (1996) define  organizational  integration  as the integration  of 
productive  actors into a business organization’s  learning  and decision-making  activities.  They 
argue that though U.S. manufacturers  have integrated  managerial  and technical  workers, they 
have established  a variety  of forms of segmentation  within  this upper-level  workforce,  and have 
for the most part failed to effect  organizational  integration  of production  workers.  In contrast, 
many manufacturers  based in Japan and Germany  have attempted  to reduce managerial 
segmentation,  to integrated  shop floor workers  into organizational  learning  processes  as well. 
Consequently,  Lazonick  and O’Sullivan  hold, U.S. companies  have been less successful  in 
developing  the skill base of their workforce  and promoting  organizational  learning.  Among the 
results of this shortfall  are losses of competitiveness  in U.S. industry,  and the diminution  of high 
quality jobs  in the U.S. economy. 
To what extent does the diagnostic  imaging equipment  industry conform  with this 
narrative  of industrial  change?  First of all, we repeat that U.S. diagnostic  imaging companies 
continue  to be internationally  competitive.  Even so, the reduced  share of second-tier  U.S. 
manufacturers  and the dramatic  expansion  of Japanese  production  bear further examination.  So 
it is still of interest to consider  the degree of organizational  integration  in the industry.  In a high 
technology  industry  such as medical  diagnostic  imaging, organizational  integration  can apply to 
a wide range of actors.  Consider  five: doctors  and hospitals,  government  agencies  and 
laboratories,  suppliers, engineers,  and production  workers.  Pending  completion  of detailed  case 
studies, the following  observations  are preliminary. 
1) Doctors and hospitals.  Doctors and hospitals  are important  to diagnostic  imaging 
manufacturers  in two ways.  First, they are sources of academic  research.  In the  1950s and 
196Os,  most imaging companies  maintained  personal contacts  with academic  researchers 
(Mitchell  1988).  Because of the uneven nature of this contact,  the businesses  learned  about 
advances  in academic  research primarily  through journal  articles  (Foote  1992)!  But from the 
1970s onward, manufacturers  have invested  much more heavily  in institutional  contacts  with 
universities  and research hospitals,  with foreign producers  such as Toshiba  (which  lacked 
22 informal  channels  for personal  contacts)  relying  particularly  strongly  on this approach.  Second, 
doctors and hospitals  are customers,  and manufacturers  count on them to offer design advice and 
to try out prototypes.  Deep, long-standing  connections  between  imaging manufacturers  and 
businesses  date back to the beginnings  of the x-ray industry, and there is no evidence  that U.S. 
producers have invested  less in this form of organizational  integration  than producers  in other 
countries. 
2) Government  agencies  and  laboratories.  Again, health  care in every industrialized 
country  has had a long history  of government  involvement  in research,  as tinder  and in some 
cases as the site of research.  And again, in this form of organizational  integration,  the United 
States is on a par with other industrial  powers-at  least in the health  care industry.  Japan’s 
diagnostic  imaging  sector was promoted  by MITI, the Ministry  of International  Trade and 
Industry. In addition  to funding  specific  research  projects,  MIT1 established  and supported 
academic  societies  devoted  to the development  of biomedical  instrumentation  (Mitchell  1988). 
In the United States, the National  Institutes  of Health  funded research  in CT, MRI, and 
ultrasound  (Foote  1992).  Other U.S. federal  agencies aiding  research  and development  in 
diagnostic  imaging  have included  the National  Science Foundation,  the National  Institute  for 
Standards and Technology,  the Food and Drug Administration,  and even the Department  of 
Defense, the Department  of Energy, and the National  Aeronautics  and Space Administration 
(U.S. Office of Technology  Assessment  1978,1981,1984). 
3) Suppliers.  In an industry in which outsourcing  is advanced,  relations  with suppliers 
are critical.  Here U.S. manufacturers  appear  to diverge from their  counterparts,  though 
evidence  is mixed.  Picker’s  CT Division,  in a World Wide Web posting (Picker  International 
1997), claims  that Picker has “extremely  close relationships”  with 20 out of 80 suppliers, 
resulting  in “long-term  (three years) contracts”  and based on “tight communications.”  It is 
difficult  to assess such claims  in the abstract, but practice  at Company  A paints a mixed picture. 
While managers  at Company  A speak of “strategic  relations”  with a core of suppliers,  Company 
A’s vigorous  pursuit of lower costs has colored  these relationships.  Managers from Company 
A’s purchasing  organization  did tell of efforts to teach suppliers  better methods of quality 
control  and inventory  management:  “We’re pretty systematically  training  our suppliers  in 
statistical  process control  and other quality  programs,”  stated on manager.  But the constant 
drive to slash costs came through  in interviews  at Company  A as well.  On the other hand, the 
three Japanese  companies  appear to maintain  long-term relationships  with suppliers,  not 
infrequently  sacrificing  short-term  cost advantages  in order to preserve the benefits  of mutual 
learning. 
4) Engineers.  Until recently,  engineering  employment  at larger U.S. high technology 
companies  was essentially  lifetime  employment.  But downsizing  and outsourcing  (especially 
outsourcing  for design and innovation)  have increased turbulence  in engineering  careers. 
Managers at Company  A commented  on widespread  feelings  of job  insecurity  and dissatisfaction 
among engineers,  undermining  company  loyalty.  They also complained  of high turnover, 
especially  among software  engineers.  One Company  A manager  spoke of sitting in a meeting 
with engineers  from a European  company  and estimating  that the typical  engineer  from that 
company  had been with the company  15 to 20 years, compared  to five years at Company  A.  “It 
23 may be expensive,”  he said of the other company’s  senior engineers,  “but they know what 
they’re  doing.”  Japanese  companies  have maintained  the lifetime  employment  guarantee  for 
engineers,  and, like Siemens, tend to retain engineers  for long periods. 
5) Production  workers.  Japanese  and U.S. companies  diverge  once more in the degree 
of organizational  integration  of production  workers.  The three Japanese  producers  use a system 
of lifetime  employment,  in-house training,  and substantial  scope for employee  involvement  in 
decision-making.  Most U.S. companies  offer no long-term  employment  guarantees.  They do 
voice a rhetoric  of continuous  learning  and employee  involvement.  Again, Picker’s  Web posting 
sets the tone, stating that “On average, each employee  receives  between  one and two weeks of 
training  each year.”  Picker describes  formal  and informal  problem-solving  teams as well as self- 
managed  production  teams, and a flattened  management  structure that “has resulted  from the 
increased  empowerment  that employees  now have” (Picker  International  1997). 
But first-hand  observation  of U.S. companies  conveys  a different  impression.  At 
Company  A, managers reported that outsourcing  and downsizing  have created  a climate  of 
insecurity,  not only among production  workers, but among engineers.  For most high-level 
managers  interviewed  in Company  A, the production  workforce  is essentially  invisible, 
particularly  since outsourcing  has pushed increasing  amounts  of production  activity  beyond the 
corporation’s  boundaries.  Company  A’s costs consist overwhelmingly  of materials  costs, and it 
is these costs, not labor, that attract most attention.  As described  in section  (2) above,  aggregate 
data for the U.S. diagnostic  imaging  industry  suggest that outsourcing  may be a widespread 
strategy, though  we do not have enough  evidence  to conclude  that Company  A is representative 
of U.S.-based producers. 
Even at Company  B, which  does attempt  to guarantee  long-term  employment  for its core 
employees,  organizational  integration  of production  workers appears to be falling  short. 
Company  B has shored up its guarantee  by expanding  the temporary  workforce.  But as noted in 
section (2) above, the size of this temporary  workforce  has impeded  organizational  integration  of 
rank-and-file  workers. 
Thus, while U.S. diagnostic  imaging equipment  manufacturers  avidly pursue 
organizational  integration  with doctors, hospitals,  and government  agencies,  they show mixed 
results at best in organizational  integration  of suppliers, engineers,  and production  workers. 
24 Conclusion 
Change  has  been  a constant  in the  U.S. diagnostic  imaging  equipment  industry.  Over  the 
last  several  decades,  rapid  technological  change  has  fed  explosive  growth  for  this  industry.  But 
growth may  be  reaching  a plateau  in the  United  States  and  other  mature  markets,  as the  bite  of 
health  care  cost  controls  intensifies.  The  most  rapidly  growing  markets  will  probably  be in Asia, 
Latin America,  and Eastern Europe.  This critical juncture  in international  competition  arises at a 
time when Japanese  producers  have been steadily  gaining  market  share in the world market. 
While the market  share of General  Electric  Medical  Systems, the world  leader, has so far 
remained  secure, the shares of second-tier  U.S. companies  have shrunk. 
As U.S. companies  rise to this challenge,  they have engaged  in over a decade of 
downsizing  and outsourcing,  with the aim of increasing  efftciency.  Based on the limited 
evidence  at our disposal,  we cannot  fully assess the impact of this restructuring  on wages and 
employment,  nor its impact on international  competitiveness.  But some managers  interviewed  at 
U.S. manufacturers  expressed concerns  that the restructuring  weakened  loyalty,  heightened 
turnover,  and took a toll in the capacity  for organizational  learning.  U.S. firms have invested 
heavily  in organizational  integration  with physicians,  hospitals,  and government  agencies.  But 
there is some evidence  that compared  to their Japanese  counterparts,  they have invested  less in 
integrating  suppliers,  engineers,  and production  workers. 
The existing  case study literature  on diagnostic  imaging  equipment  offers little  help in 
sorting out the causal relationships  among these patterns.  This literature  (for example  McKay 
1983, Friar  1986, Mitchell  1988, 1995, Morone  1993, Steinberg and Cohen  1984, Trajtenberg 
1990) focuses squarely  on innovation  and corporate  strategy.  But overwhelmingly,  for these 
analysts, the workforce  remains  invisible. 
Additional  case study analysis  is needed to flesh out the story of the diagnostic  imaging 
equipment  industry.  Case studies could  illuminate  a number of questions  that have arisen in this 
report: 
l To  what extent the U.S. industry’s changes  in employment  and ftrm size reflect 
widespread  outsourcing,  as opposed to other changes. 
l The  wage  effects  of  outsourcing,  through  examination  of  wages  at suppliers  as well as 
at the outsourcing  companies. 
l The specific  types of products  in which particular  countries  and companies  enjoy 
competitive  advantages. 
l In addition  to the market  regions and product lines in which Japanese  imaging 
equipment  companies  have been able to expand their market  share, the reasons  for this increase 
in share. 
l The relative  degree of vertical  integration  and outsourcing  in U.S. as compared  to 
Japanese  diagnostic  imaging companies. 
25 . A more  careful  assessment  of the  degree  of organizational  integration,  particularly  as 
regards  suppliers,  engineers,  and  production  workers,  in U.S.  and  Japanese  equipment 
companies. 
Through  all of  these  component  parts,  additional  case  study  research  could  take  the  next 
step  in examining  the  connections  among  organizational  integration,  competitive  success,  and 
the  number  and  quality  of jobs  in diagnostic  imaging  equipment  manufacturing  firms. 
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